We investigate whether new-exporter firms have a higher probability to start exporting in the countries where their financing banks have already settled their subsidiaries. The underlying mechanism we hypothesize is based on the transmission of knowledge on foreign market from the banks to the firms, able to cut down informational barriers to international trade. We found a significant positive relationship between the firm probability to begin exporting in one market, and the presence in the same market of a subsidiary of the firm financing bank. Our empirical exercises suggest that the correlation found is not due to other possible mechanisms. Namely, to the firms choosing the internationalized bank in the market where they are planning to export, nor to the banks following abroad their clients.
Bank Internationalization and Firm Exports:
Evidence from Matched Firm-Bank Data
Introduction
The literature examining whether credit constraints affect firms internationalization has rapidly expanded over the last years (see e.g. Greenaway, Guariglia and Kneller (2007) ; Berman and Hericourt (2010) ; Bellone, Musso, Nesta and Schiavo (2010) and Minetti and Zhu (2011) ). The economic argument of these studies is grounded on the new international trade theories with heterogeneous enterprises. Since to engage in offshore activities implies large sunk costs, only better, more productive firms are able to penetrate into foreign markets through exports (Melitz (2003) ; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) ). In this framework, credit constraints hamper internationalization because they prevent enterprises to raise funds for financing fixed exporting costs (for the theoretical contributions see: Chaney (2005) and Manova (2010) ).
Unlike financial constraints and internationalization, whether and how the characteristics of bank-firm relationships affect firm propensity to export is an issue scantily studied. 1 Our paper contributes to this stream of research. We investigate whether new-exporter firms have a higher probability to start exporting in the countries where their financing banks have already settled their subsidiaries. The underlying mechanism we hypothesize is based on the transmission of knowledge from the banks to the firms, able to cut down informational barriers to international trade. Banks with subsidiaries abroad collect overtime a wide stock of information on the foreign countries that can be easily transmitted to their clients through the usual, informal, bank-firm contacts. Such valuable flow of knowledge allows firms to reduce fixed start-up costs associated to the entry into a new foreign market. This intangible asset turns out to be particularly helpful for small and medium enterprises that are less equipped to start international business. In addition, it is more precious if the relevant entry costs are specific to each destination countries, as theoretically postulated by Chaney (2008) and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) , and empirically shown by Moxnes (2010) . This mechanism is empirically supported by both anecdotal and survey-based evidence. The largest banks offer a wide set of non-financial services, especially de-voted to small and medium enterprises, to support firm internationalization. These services range from helping enterprises to find potentially profitable off-shore markets and suitable foreign clients or suppliers, to consulting facilities on foreign legal system or on country political and institutional framework. The relevance of such support is also acknowledged by firms (see Bartoli et al. (2011) ).
We take advantage of detailed matched firm-bank data that provide information on firm exports as well as on firm-bank relationships. In particular, we know the destination country of exports in 2008 and if firms have ever exported before. Moreover, we are able to link firm information with the characteristics of their financing banks.
Namely, we know if and where banks financing firms have subsidiaries abroad. As a result, we can regress firm probability of exporting for the first time in one country on the presence of her financing banks in the same country, together with a large set of controls at the firm and country level.
The link between the destination country of exports and the country where the financing banks have subsidiaries might also be due to reasons different from the transmission of information from banks to firms. For example, firms that are planning to export in certain markets could choose a bank internationalized in the same countries for accessing abroad to the usual banking services. Moreover, the causality nexus might be the other way round. That is, it could be the banks that follow the firms by establishing foreign subsidiaries where their clients export (Seth, Nolle and Mohanty, 1998 ). Our empirical model, together with some auxiliary robustness exercises, suggests that the link is not due to the firms that choose the bank established in the export country, nor to the banks that follow abroad their clients.
We found a significant positive relationship between the firm probability to start exporting in one market and the presence, in the same market, of a subsidiary of the financing bank, which is robust to several sensitivity tests. Our paper provides empirical evidence on a causal link, until now unexplored, which has an intuitive economic implication. To be client of internationalized banks can be helpful to start new international business. This result turns out to be relevant not only for the firm strategic purposes, but also to understand the forces able to strengthen firm international competitiveness, and the indirect effects of the bank-firm relationships.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss 3 the theoretical background and the research papers more related to our analysis. In section 3 we describe the data set used. In section 4 we present the empirical model and the baseline results, while in subsequent section we carry out some robustness tests. In section 6 are collected the main conclusive considerations.
Background and related literature
On the theoretical ground our paper is based on the recent international trade theories with heterogeneous enterprises, stemming from Melitz (2003) , Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) (for two excellent reviews, see Helpman (2006) and ). Such theories argue that firms willing to engage in international activities face considerable fixed entry costs. For example, to become exporter, firms must gather information on the foreign market, adapt their products to the foreign tastes, create a distributional system and start new business relationships.
Since all these activities imply sunk costs, only more productive, usually larger firms are capable to overcome such outlays to export. In the most recent contributions these entry fixed costs are considered specific of each export market, as postulated by Chaney (2008) and Eaton et al. (2011) . Empirically, Moxnes (2010) shows that country specific entry costs are much larger than global sunk export costs.
Our hypothesis is that banks that have established subsidiaries abroad collect overtime a large stock of knowledge on the foreign countries where they are settled. Such intangible assets can be easily transmitted to their customers, allowing enterprises to reduce the sunk cost associated to the entry into the new foreign market. This soft information turns out to be extremely valuable for smaller enterprises, which are less equipped to begin international business, and if the fixed costs are specific to each destination countries. It is also plausible to assume that the information flows from the bank to the firms are wider, the longer and stronger is the bank-firm relationship.
That is, inside long-lasting bank-firm relationships or if the internationalized bank is the main credit supplier of the firms.
The capability of financial intermediaries to pull down the fixed costs of internationalization has been recently explored by a flourishing literature on exports and financial constraints. This literature is based on similar theoretical arguments. Given the presence of sunk costs, export activity can start only whether firms can raise finance resources to cover the associated fixed outlays. On the opposite, firms that are financially constrained are unable to reach the foreign markets. Theoretical contributions include Chaney (2005) , Muuls (2008) and Manova (2010) . Empirical papers encompass, among others, , Bridges and Guariglia (2008) , Berman and Hericourt (2010) , Egger and Kesina (2010) , Bellone et al. (2010), Manole and Spatareanu (2010) and Minetti and Zhu (2011) . In these studies, the econometric strategy has been to regress the probability to export -to study the extensive margin of trade -or the export volume -to examine the intensive margin of trade -, on opportune measures of firms' financial constraints. Credit rationing at the firm level is approximated using either financial balance sheet variables or specific information directly gathered through surveys. In order to deal with the endogeneity issues, these papers usually utilize instrumental variable method. The econometric investigations provided mixed evidence on the role of financial constraints on firm trade performance. As regards Italy, Minetti and Zhu (2011) found that credit rationing reduces the probability to export as well as the level of foreign sales.
The link between banking services and firm internationalization has been further explored from a different perspective by Bartoli et al. (2011) . ized banks (in this case measured by the duration of the bank-firm relationship) have higher probability to undertake foreign direct investments. Ricci and Trionfetti (2012) go further and find that the firm probability to export is positively affected by the share of working capital financed by foreign-owned banks. The authors assume that the linkages with foreign networks help firm to overcome the informational barriers reducing entry export costs.
Our paper is also related to a less recent stream of literature that investigated if the country financial development affects its trade performance. See e.g.: Beck (2002) , Becker and Greeberg (2005) , Hur (2006) and Samba and Yan (2009) . Unlike our study, however, these contributions follow a macro-economic approach. Beck (2002) , for example, develops a theoretical model with asymmetric information where the financial development affects the growth of the sector with increasing returns to scale.
As a result, countries with a better-developed financial system will show a higher export share and a positive trade balance in manufacturing. The model is tested across 65 countries over 30 years, providing empirical support to his theory.
Although in the last years the literature on the role played by firm financing on firm export performance has rapidly expanded, to the best of our knowledge no paper has examined the link between firms that start exporting into a foreign country and the presence in the same country of their financing banks. This paper fills such gap.
Data
Our empirical exercise benefits from a unique dataset, built taking from three different sources.
Firstly, we draw information about firm export activities from the European firms Finally, we join the information about firm export activities and those on bank internationalization by using information on bank-firm relationships, drawn from the Central credit register (CCR), maintained at the Bank of Italy. The CCR provides bank-firm level information on a large set of financial variables. We are interested, in particular, in the amount of credit granted. We collect annual end-of-the-year data, from 1998 to 2010. In this way we are able to map, for every firm in our sample, the set of financing banks. The CCR provides information about the universe of Italian firm-banks relationships where the amount of borrowed funds is above a threshold of 75,000 euro. The last set of firms, which we will refer to as the "non-exporters", is smaller in size than the group of firms that exported "sometimes" before 2008 and that of "regular"
exporters (see Table 1 ). In addition, as expected, firms that regularly exported before 2008 are larger: they have about 85 employees on average, almost three times those of firms that exported sometimes or never before 2008; 33 and 30 employees, respectively. Table 2 shows the distribution of "non-exporter" firms (before 2008) according to their headquarters: about 80 per cent of them are located in the Centre and Northern
Italy. The predominant sub-sector of economic activity among "non-exporters" is fabrication of metal products (more than one quarter of the sample), followed by food products and non metallic minerals products (about 10 per cent both; see Table 3 ). The distribution of branches over foreign countries is very concentrated. The first 5 banks count together for more than three quarters of the foreign branches. The most internationalized bank is Unicredit, with branches in 18 countries (see Table 5 ).
Empirical model and results
In order to investigate the links between foreign banking activity and firm export decisions we rely on a firm-country level dataset. Table 6 ). This leads us to a dataset of about 90,000 firm-country pairs observations.
It turns out that 52 out of 769 firms start exporting in 2008. On average they export to 1.5 countries; only two firms export to more than 3 countries. 3 Hence, the fact that EFIGE dataset only lists the top 3 export countries for each firm is not binding in our dataset. The new exports are directed to 33 countries (see Table 7 ).
France and Germany have the largest share (15.2 and 12.7 percent, respectively). The probability to export is relatively uniformly distributed across the remaining countries.
We estimate the following probit model, where the unit of analysis is the pair firm i-country c:
3 Respectively, 4 and 7.
export ic is our dependent variable, which takes the value one if firm i exports to the country c and zero otherwise. The empirical model includes a large set of variables at the firm and country-level, to control for the probability of exporting in each potential market.
X i is a vector of firm-level variables, such as headquarter's location and productivity; 4 moreover, all regressions include sector dummies (2-digit NACE), firm size class dummies (3 classes), and a dummy for firms belonging to a business group. between the region where firm i is headquartered and country c's capital city.
Given the data structure (each firm appears 116 times in the sample) and the fact that most control variables only vary across firms (productivity, business group, location, NACE-2 dummies and size dummies), we cluster the standard errors at firm level in all our regressions. as we consider earlier two-year periods. They are all statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. When we look at the marginal effects, we find that the magnitude of such impact is rather large. In particular, if a firm has been borrowing from a bank with a foreign branch in a certain country, her probability to start exporting in that country is 44 percent higher than the mean probability that any firm in the sample begins exporting there.
As expected, the total volume of country imports positively affects the probability to start exporting in that country, whereas there is no significant effect of the country imports growth rate. Distance between firms and countries also plays a role, confirming previous evidence that export decision is strongly affected by the geographical proximity.
To have found a significant relationship between bank internationalization and firm export decision is not yet enough to support the hypothesis that the soft information about foreign markets, provided by the banks to the firms, enhances their probability to export. In particular, there are two main identification issues we need to tackle.
Firstly, we need to disentangle the hypothesis at hand, i.e. the firm follows the bank (Seth et al., 1998) , from the opposite case, i.e. the bank follows the firm, or the bank and the firm jointly plan to access foreign markets. Secondly, we need to control for another possible mechanism, where willing-to-export firms choose banks accordingly to their presence abroad. For example, to have access offshore to the standard banking services.
Concerning the first issue, since our sample consists of firms that never exported should result in a larger effect on the export probability. On the contrary, if the effect truly goes from the bank to the firm, it is reasonable to expect a larger effect for the bank-firms relationships which started earlier, since there have been a longer period over which the information can be transmitted from the former to the latter. Table 9 provides some comforting evidence against the hypothesis that our baseline result is driven by firms cherry picking banks. In particular, the coefficient of interest is not statistically significant when it reflects the bank-firm relationships that began in the years 2005-07, the period just before the export year, whereas it turns significant when we consider bank firm relationships that began earlier.
Robustness
Up to now our sample consisted of 769 firms that never exported before 2008. In this way we were able to precisely model the decision to enter into the foreign market for the first time as a function of bank internalization. On the other hand, working with such a sharp sample leaves us with very few firms that start exporting in 2008 (52 firms against 717 firms that remain non-exporters). Since we observe firm-country pairs, and firm export on average to 1.5 countries, our dependent variable takes value one in about 0.1 per cent of the cases. In this rare events setting, probit models might underestimate the true parameters (King and Zen, 2001) . In order to address this potential bias we follow two different approaches.
Firstly, we resample our dataset by selecting only a subsample of the firms among those who never exported before 2008 and that remain domestic in 2008. In this way we obtain a more balanced sample, with our bank-firm dependent variable switching now in about 1 per cent of the cases. Now the number of non-exporting firms is 100. In order to deal with the selection bias arising from outcome-based sampling we randomly select the subsample of never-exporters and estimate our baseline model. We perform this exercise from 100 to 1000 times in order to generate distributions of our estimates. The results, reported in Table 10 , show indeed larger average coefficients, supporting the claim of underestimation associated to the model fitted on the full sample. However, the bias does not seem to be too severe.
Secondly, we increase the sample size by adding to the baseline sample (of the 769 firms that never exported before 2008) the sample of about 500 firms that claimed to have exported "sometimes" before 2008 (the sample we labeled b in section 3).
Hence, we end up with a sample of 1235 firms. Among them, about one third export in 2008. Results, reported in Table 11 , support our previous findings. Expectedly, our estimates are also more precise. However, since we introduced firms that already exported in the past, the interpretation of the coefficient of interest is tricky, as we cannot rule out those cases where the bank follows the firm. As further check, in order to limit such bias we replicate our estimates on the extended sample after excluding the largest firms (average sales above 10 millions euro). Those firms are indeed more likely to be followed abroad by the banks. Estimated coefficients, in Table 12 , are still strongly statistically significant.
Finally, in order to validate our results we check that they are not obtained from considering just any random export destination country for the (few) firms that start exporting and run a couple of falsification tests. In the first one we randomly assign to the new exporter firms a target country and fit our model on the simulated network.
The random allocation is constructed as follows. For each firm we keep track of the number of her exporting countries. Next, we allocate to the firm the same number of countries, randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over the entire set of countries found in our dataset. Firm's bank relationships remain unchanged. We perform the random allocation up to 1000 times in order to generate a distribution of the coefficient of interest. The mean estimate of the coefficient is always about zero, with a standard error of about 0.19 (see Table 13 ). Moreover, the majority of point estimates are not statistically significant. We obtain a similar result if we randomly sample the target countries from the subset of the top 50 markets in terms of Italian firms' exports.
In the second falsification test we perform an alternative network scrambling. As we have seen, the variable of interest, the dummy subs ic , takes value one if any of the firm i's lending banks has a branch in country c. In this setting, if Italian banks mainly choose their foreign target countries following the same criteria as the exporting firms (for instance: geographical proximity, amount of foreign investments, immigrants, trade agreements, etc.), the results that we have found would reflect a spurious relationship. In order to check for that, we artificially replace the set of financing banks for each new exporter firm and then estimate again our model. Since we are drawing banks from the same (Italian) banking system, if our main result stems from a spurious country-level relationship we should still find a significant relationship between bank internationalization and firm export decisions. On the other hand, if the impact truly depends on some specific bank-firm linkages, we should find none. For the sake of simplicity we replace the set of banks for each new exporter firm with the set of banks of a very similar (non-exporter) firm and estimate our model once. The matched firm is found by nearest-neighbor matching, according to sector and size. For each pair of firms we make sure that enterprises belong to different regions, in order to minimize the probability that both firms are client of exactly the same set of banks.
Results, reported in Table 14 , show that the coefficient of interest is never statistically significant and much smaller in size with respect to the baseline estimates.
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Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed if firms customer of internationalized banks have a higher probability to start exporting in the countries where their banks have a subsidiary. We find a significant positive relationship between the foreign market of newexporter firm, and the presence in the same market of its financing banks. We argue that firms benefit from the information on the foreign country collected by their banks which are easily transmittable to their clients. This flow of knowledge helps firms to overcome informational barrier to international trade, reducing the sunk cost to start exporting.
Our empirical exercises suggest that the relationship found is not due to other possible mechanisms. Namely, to the firms choosing the internationalized bank in the market where they are planning to export, nor to the banks following abroad their clients.
Our contribution sheds some light on a causal link, up to now unexplored by the theoretical and empirical literature, that offers a straightforward economic implication.
Firms can take remarkable advantage from being customer of internationalized banks.
The result turns out to be relevant for the firm strategic purposes, but also to better understand the forces able to strengthen firm international competitiveness.
This paper contributes to a fruitful, but so far scantily explored line of research.
Theoretical and empirical investigations able to enlighten further the role played by the bank-firm relationships on firm internationalization, together with the underlying driving mechanisms, are thus welcome. Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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